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GENDER EQUITY IN ATHLETICS:
COMING OF AGE IN THE 90's
T. JESSE WILDE*
Every college or university athletic director dreams of having ample
funds to provide sports programs that would satisfy every imaginable
interest.' The harsh economic realities of college athletics in the 90's,
however, are driving athletic administrators in two seemingly irreconcil-
able directions.2 On one hand, athletic budgets at many institutions are
rapidly shrinking (as part of campus-wide cost cutting measures) leaving
athletic administrators with little recourse but to streamline their pro-
grams, and ultimately eliminate some sport offerings. 3 On the other
hand, there is a growing momentum in favor of enhancing women's ath-
letic programs and eliminating sex discrimination in college sports. As a
result of a multitude of factors discussed in this article, public sentiment
and attention has finally been focused on equal treatment of the sexes in
college athletics, mandating that colleges and universities provide ath-
letic opportunities for male and female students in numbers proportion-
ate to their respective student body enrollments.4 This equity
movement, however, comes at a time when athletic departments can ill
afford to pay for new programs. The conflict, therefore, between fiscal
restraint and enhancing female athletic opportunities in the name of gen-
der equity is stretching many athletic budgets to the breaking point.5
Even though the current gender equity movement in college athletics
encompasses a broad spectrum of issues, including equal opportunities
for female athletic administrators and equal pay for coaches,6 this article
* Assistant Professor of Sport Law and Director of the Sport Management Program at
Rice University, Houston, Texas. B.A. 1982, University of Alberta (Canada); LL.B. 1985,
University of Alberta (Canada); M.S. 1990, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
1. Bill Byrne, Funding New Women's Sports Will Stretch Budgets to Breaking Point, USA
TODAY, June 9, 1992, at 10C.
2. Gary Roberts, Colleges Must Decide on Revenue Questions, USA TODAY, June 9, 1992,
at 10C.
3. Gene Corrigan, Reaching Gender Equity No Easy Task, USA TODAY, May 14, 1992, at
14C.
4. Malcolm Moran, Title IXIs Now an Irresistible Force, N.Y. TIMaS, Jan. 21, 1992, at § L,
S1.
5. Byrne, supra note 1, at 10C.
6. Equal pay for female coaches, for example, has become a hot issue recently, as a
number of women's varsity coaches have commenced actions seeking compensation compara-
ble to what men's coaches receive. In June 1993, Howard University basketball coach, Sanya
1'le', was awarded $1.1 million in her discrimination suit against the university. In August
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will focus on the enduring quest for an equitable division of opportuni-
ties between male and female students to participate in intercollegiate
athletics. Part I will review legal principles relevant to gender equity in
athletics. Herein, the article will examine the history and evolution of
Title IX7 and its specific application to college athletics. Thereafter, rele-
vant equal protection principles embodied in federal and state constitu-
tions will be briefly outlined. Part II will consider the impact of Title IX
on college athletics. Particular emphasis will be devoted to reviewing
recent efforts of student-athletes to litigiously preserve and promote fe-
male athletic opportunities, and to examine gender equity initiatives pro-
posed or adopted by colleges and universities and various governing
athletic organizations. Part III will consider the future prospects for this
gender equity struggle and outline the author's "Three-for-One" gender
equity proposal, designed to provide an athletic administrator with an
achievable and realistic plan for satisfying the athletic interests and abili-
ties of both sexes on campus.
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Title IX
1. History
More than twenty years ago, Congress enacted Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, which provides in part that: "No person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assist-
ance."' Even though athletics and athletic programs were not specifi-
cally mentioned in Title IX when it first became law, the Act has become
the cornerstone 9 of federal statutory protection for female athletes and
1993, two other coaches commenced equal-pay suits: Ann Pitts, women's golf coach at
Oklahoma State; and, Marianne Stanley, former women's basketball coach at the University
of Southern California. At the time of this writing, Pam Bowers, women's basketball coach at
Baylor University had also announced her intention to file an equal-pay suit against the uni-
versity (January 1994). For a discussion of legal principles relevant to sex discrimination in
coaching and athletic employment, see Glenn M. Wong & Richard J. Ensor, Sex Discrimina-
tion in Athletics: A Review of Two Decades of Accomplishments and Defeats, 21 GONZAGA L.
REV. 345, 385-389 (1985/86).
7. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-09,86 Stat. 235 (codified at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1990)) [hereinafter Title IX].
8. Id.
9. See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U.
MIAMI ErNr. & SPORTS L. REv. 1, at 2 (1992). Since the enactment of Title IX in 1972, the
number of high schools in the country offering girls' basketball increased from 4000 to 17,000
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prospective female athletes in the United States,' ° prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex in educational programs and activities receiv-
ing federal financial assistance, including interscholastic and
intercollegiate athletic programs."
2. Scope and Application
The legislative history of Title IX suggests that the Act was originally
intended to have limited scope, covering only those educational pro-
grams receiving federal financial assistance, and was not directed at im-
posing gender equity requirements on specific programs, like athletic
departments of educational institutions, that received no direct federal
funding.12 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW),
charged with the responsibility of developing regulations and enforcing
Title IX requirements, however, broadly construed Title IX as applying
to all activities, including athletic programs of educational institutions or
agencies, if the institution or agency was in receipt of any federal assist-
ance. 3 In 1975, HEW issued its first set of proposed regulations
designed to implement Title IX, specifically incorporating interscholastic
and intercollegiate athletics within the scope of Title IX coverage.' 4
Notwithstanding HEW's broad interpretation of Title IX, the thresh-
old issue' 5 remained; whether, in law, Title IX applied only to the spe-
cific departments receiving direct federal funding (commonly referred to
as the "programmatic approach") or extended to any department within
an institution that benefits from federal assistance (commonly referred
in 1987. Women's participation in college athletics grew from 66,000 to over 150,000 during
that same period.
10. Since female athletes have been historically underrepresented in interscholastic and
intercollegiate sports, many associate Title IX with enhancing female athletic opportunities.
Title IX, however, has also been successful in creating athletic opportunities for men. See
Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated as
moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979) (where the district court required a high school to provide a
male student with the chance to play volleyball on the girls' team or to form a boys' team).
11. Wong & Ensor, supra note 6, at 359.
12. See Janet L. Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside HEW's Jurisdic-
tion, 65 GEo. L.J. 49, 56-63 (1976). For an examination of the legislative history of Title IX in
respect to athletics, see Christine Johnson, The Evolution of Title IX Prospects for Equality in
Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 759 (1981); John Gaal, Louis P.
DiLorenzo and Thomas S. Evans, HEW's Final "Policy Interpretation" of Title IX and Inter-
collegiate Athletics, 6 J.C.U.L. 345 (1980); and, Heckman, supra note 9.
13. Michael P. Villalobos, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J.
149 at 150 (1990).
14. 45 C.F.R. 86 (1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. Part 106 (1991)).
15. Heckman, supra note 9, at 29.
19941
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
to as the "institutional approach").' 6 The resolution of this issue had
tremendous significance since few athletic departments or athletic as-
sociations receive federal funds.17 If the statute was interpreted in ac-
cordance with the "programmatic approach," to require only the specific
programs that receive direct federal assistance to comply with its provi-
sions, Title IX would provide no remedy to redress sex discrimination in
most athletic programs. The issue was ultimately decided by the
Supreme Court in Grove City College v. Bell,'" wherein the Court fa-
vored the programmatic approach, concluding that only those specific
programs within an institution receiving direct financial assistance from
the federal government should be subject to Title IX requirements and
sanctions. 19
What momentum the gender-equity movement had mustered seemed
lost. In 1972, before the enactment of Title IX, only 15% of intercollegi-
ate athletic participants were women. By 1984, that percentage had
16. Wong & Ensor, supra note 6, at 368. For further discussion of this issue, see Gaal,
supra note 12 Id. at 345; Villalobos, supra note 13; Comment, The Reform of Women's Inter-
collegiate Athletics: Title IX, Equal Protection, and Supplemental Methods, 20 CAP. U. L. REv.
691 (1991); Heckman, supra note 9; and, Note, Compensatory Damages are Available in Inten-
tional Sexual Discrimination Cases-Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 3 SETON
HALL J. OF SPORT LAW 197 (1993).
17. Heckman, supra note 9, at 3.
18. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
19. Id. at 564-577. Grove City College is a private liberal arts college located in Penn-
sylvania. Id. at 559. To maintain its autonomy, the college continually declined to take part in
federally and state sponsored direct institutional aid programs, as well as numerous federal
student aid programs. Id. The school did accept a substantial number of students who re-
ceived Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) from the Alternate Disbursement
System of the Department of Education. Id. In these circumstances, the Department of Edu-
cation found that the college was a recipient of federal funding requiring the institution to file
an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX. Id. at 560. When Grove City did not sign the
Assurance of Compliance, the college and four of its students filed suit in the District Court of
Western Pennsylvania to invalidate the Department of Education's termination of the BE-
OGs. The district court found that BEOGs received by the students constituted federal aid
but that the Department of Education could not terminate the students' aid simply because
the school failed to file the Assurance of Compliance. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F.
Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that
the Department of Education could terminate aid for failure of the college to execute an
Assurance of Compliance. The court also found that indirect as well as direct aid triggered
coverage under Title IX, and, although Title IX's language should be given a program-specific
interpretation, funds flowing to Grove City through its students were similar to non-
earmarked aid, and that in such cases the school itself was the program. Grove City College v.
Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 1199 (1983), and affirmed,
465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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doubled to 30.8%.20 In the wake of Grove City, however, it appeared
that the growth period had ceased since Title IX could no longer be en-
forced against athletic programs not receiving direct federal financial
assistance. As a direct result of Grove City, the Department of Educa-
tion's Office of Civil Rights (OCR),21 the administering agency for Title
IX, suspended all current and pending Title IX compliance investigations
of high school and college athletic departments until it could be estab-
lished that the programs directly received federal funds.22
On the heels of Grove City, a number of amendments were intro-
duced to legislatively reverse the Supreme Court's programmatic inter-
pretation of Title IX.2 Such amending legislation failed to gain support
until March 1988, when, after overriding a veto by President Ronald
Reagan,24 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.15
The Act clarified that entire institutions and agencies are covered by Ti-
tle IX, and other federal anti-discrimination laws26 if any program or
activity within the organization receives federal aid.27
3. Title IX Athletics Requirements
Following the passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
athletic administrators could no longer hide behind the programmatic
interpretation to shield their programs from the requirements of Title
IX. As such, administrators were compelled to assess departmental
compliance under the substantive requirements of the law.
To assist athletic administrators in understanding the requirements of
the Title IX and its regulations, and to aid in assessing Title IX compli-
ance, the Department of Education, through the OCR, issued a Title IX
Policy Interpretation in December 1979.28 While the Policy Interpreta-
tion does not have the force of law, the document provides the guide-
20. Villalobos, supra note 13, at 151.
21. See Wong & Ensor, supra note 6, at 359 n.77. Prior to 1984, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was divided into two agencies, the Department of
Education and the Department of Health and Human Services. The Office of Civil Rights
(OCR) operates under the Department of Education.
22. Id. at 370.
23. For a review of attempts to legislatively reverse the Supreme Court's "programmatic"
interpretation in favor of the "institutional approach," see Villalobos, supra note 13, at 149;
and, Wong & Ensor, supra note 6, at 371 n.135.
24. Heckman, supra note 9, at 33.
25. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
26. Id. The legislation similarly amended Title IV, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Age
Discrimination Act.
27. Id.
28. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
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lines used by the OCR in assessing Title IX compliance. Therefore, it is
useful in clarifying the vague and imprecise requirements of Title IX.
In accordance with its Policy Interpretation, examines three areas in
assessing an athletic department's compliance with Title IX: (1) athletic
financial assistance;2 9 (2) other nonfinancial program areas;30 and, (3)
the accommodation of athletic interests and abilities of students.3'
First, Title IX regulations and the Policy Interpretation 32 require in-
stitutions to allocate athletic financial assistance in proportion to the
number of male and female participants in its athletic program.33 If the
proportion of total scholarship aid given to male and female athletes is
substantially equal to the ratio of male and female athletes, or if a dis-
parity is explained by certain nondiscriminatory factors, the institution
may be considered in compliance with this requirement. 4 The Policy
Interpretation lists two examples of nondiscriminatory factors which
would permit disproportionality in favor of one sex: The higher cost of
tuition for students from out-of-state and the discretion of an institution
to make reasonable professional decisions concerning the scholarship
awards most appropriate for team or program development.35
Second, for all other nonfinancial athletic program components, Title
IX regulations require an institution to provide its athletes with
equivalent treatment, benefits and opportunities in ten enumerated ar-
eas.36 Equal athletic expenditures are not required, but an athletics pro-
29. 45 C.F.R. Pt. 86.37(c) (1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (1991)); 44 Fed. Reg.
71,415 (1979).
30. 45 C.F.R. Pt. 86.41(c) (1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1991)); 44 Fed. Reg.
71,415 (1979).
31. 45 C.F.R. Pt. 86A1(c)(1) (1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1991)); 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,418 (1979).
32. While the Policy Interpretation does not have the force and effect of law, it does have
considerable practical significance since it sets forth the standards by which the Department of
Education assesses compliance with Title IX and its regulations. See Villalobos, supra note 13,
at 155.
33. 45 C.F.R. Part 86.37(c) (1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (1991)); 44 Fed. Reg.
71,415 (1979).
34. Id. See also, Gaal, supra note 12, at 346-347.
35. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979).
36. 45 C.F.R. Part 86.41(c) (1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1991)). This subsec-
tion provides: (c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for mem-
bers of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are available the Director will
consider, among other factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the
interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
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gram must exhibit equivalent treatment and distribution of benefits and
opportunities in terms of equipment and supplies, games and practice
schedules, travel and per diem allowances, coaches and tutors, medical
and training services, housing and dining facilities and services, locker
rooms, practice and competitive facilities, publicity, support services, and
the recruitment of athletes. Identical treatment, benefits, and opportuni-
ties, are not required, provided the overall effect of any differences is
negligible,37 or the disparities are the result of recognized nondiscrimina-
tory factors.38 Examples of such factors outlined in the Policy Interpre-
tation include: the unique aspects of particular sports, such as football,
where the rules of play, equipment requirements, rates of participant in-
jury, and facilities requirement for competition may result in an imbal-
ance in favor of men; special circumstances of a temporary nature;
spectator management requirements at more popular athletic events;
and, differences that have not been remedied but which an institution is
voluntarily working to correct.39
Third, and perhaps most relevant to the focus of this article, Title IX
regulations and the Policy Interpretation require institutions to effec-
tively accommodate the athletic interests and abilities of all students.4"
More specifically, the Policy Interpretation mandates that institutions ac-
commodate effectively the athletic interests and abilities of its female
and male students to the extent necessary to provide equal opportunity
in the selection of sports and levels of competition available to members
of both sexes. In selecting sports offerings, institutions are not required
to integrate their teams, nor provide the same choice of sports to men
and women. 41 However, where an institution sponsors a team in a par-
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
The accommodation of student interests and abilities (34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1991)) is given
specific and separate attention in the Policy Interpretation (44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979)). In
addition to the remaining nine enumerated areas, subsection 106.41(c) also permits the OCR
to consider two other factors in the determination of equal opportunity: the recruitment of
athletes and provision of support services.
37. Id. See also, Gaal, supra note 12, at 347.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 45 C.F.R. Pt. 86.41(c)(1) (1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1991)); 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,418 (1979).
41. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
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ticular sport for members of one sex, it may be required either to permit
the excluded sex to try out for the team or to sponsor a separate team
for the previously excluded sex.42 In providing athletes of each sex with
levels of competition, which equally reflect their interests and abilities,
institutions must provide both the opportunity for individuals of each sex
to participate in intercollegiate competition, and for these athletes to
have competitive team schedules which equally reflect their abilities.
Compliance with this two-fold requirement can be satisfied by any one
of the following three tests:
(1) whether the institution's intercollegiate level participation oppor-
tunities for male and female students are provided in numbers substan-
tially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) where the members of one sex have been and are under repre-
sented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a
history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demon-
strably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the mem-
bers of that sex; or
(3) where the members of one sex are underrepresented among in-
tercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing prac-
tice of program expansion, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities43 of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program.44
The assessment of whether an institution has satisfied the require-
ments of Title IX is made on a program-wide basis, focusing on the over-
all provision of equivalent opportunities in the athletic program in terms
of athletic financial assistance, equivalence in other athletic benefits and
opportunities, and effective accommodation of student interests and
abilities. An investigation may, however, be limited to less than all three
42. Id.
43. The Policy Interpretation provides that institutions may determine the athletic inter-
ests and abilities of students by nondiscriminatory methods of their choosing provided:
(a) The processes take into account the nationally increasing levels of women's interests
and abilities;
(b) The methods of determining interest and ability do not disadvantage the members of
an underrepresented sex;
(c) The methods of determining ability take into account team performance records; and
(d) The methods are responsive to the expressed interests of students capable of intercol-
legiate competition who are members of an underrepresented sex. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417 (1979).
44. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
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of these major areas where unique circumstances justify limiting a partic-
ular investigation to one or two of the compliance criteria.45
It should also be emphasized that comparisons to determine Title IX
compliance are not made on a sport-specific basis, comparing particular
sport offerings or specific classes of sports (such as revenue-producing
versus non-revenue-producing). 46 The revenue-producing sport of foot-
ball, for example, is given no separate or special treatment under Title
IX.47 The large number of athletes required for football, however, in-
creases the number of male participants in the overall program, thus in-
creasing the amount of financial aid to be allocated to men under the
proportionality test. With respect to other program components, certain
special requirements of football are recognized as nondiscriminatory dif-
ferences justifying departures from equivalency in such areas as medical
services, equipment, facilities required for competition, maintenance of
those facilities, special event management needs related to crowd size
and special publicity requirements.4a The accommodation of the inter-
ests and abilities of both men and women at an institution becomes more
problematic when football's large roster size is factored into the equa-
tion. Since women do not have a corresponding sport requiring such a
large number of athletes, the athletic participation ratio between men
and women at most institutions is dramatically skewed in favor of male
opportunities. Many argue that when football is factored into the pro-
portional opportunity equation, it becomes practically and economically
impossible for an institution to achieve a male to female athletics partici-
pation ratio that even closely resembles its student body ratio.49
4. Title IX Enforcement
As mentioned above, the Department of Education, through the
OCR, is responsible for enforcing compliance with Title IX.5o The OCR
45. TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL (April 1990). The Manual was issued
by the OCR to assist its personnel in conducting Title IX athletic investigations.
46. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
47. In fact, various amendments, introduced in Congress to exempt revenue-producing
sports from the requirements of Title IX, were each defeated. For a discussion of these pro-
posed amendments, including the Tower Amendments (1974 and 1975), the Helms' Amend-
ment (1975), and the McClure Amendment (1976). See Heckman, supra note 9, at 11. See
also N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 532 n.22 & 533 n.24 (1982); and, Haffer v.
Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 534-35 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir. 1982),
motion for consideration, 678 F.Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
48. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
49. Roberts, supra note 2. See also Tom Weir, All Must Face Cold Facts of Title IX, USA
TODAY, March 13, 1992, at 3C; and, discussion infra at notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
50. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1991); 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
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conducts Title 'IX reviews of schools based on complaints brought by
individuals and can also select schools at random for compliance re-
views." If the OCR investigation finds the institution in compliance,
that finding will be published and the case closed. If violations are
found, the OCR may still find the institution in compliance with Title IX
if the institution has or agrees to formulate and implement a corrective
plan.13 In this instance, the OCR monitors the progress of the institu-
tional plan; if the institution subsequently fails to implement its plan, it
will be found in noncompliance.5 4 When an institution is found in non-
compliance, and voluntary compliance attempts are unsuccessful, the
Department of Education may begin the formal process leading to ter-
mination of the institution's federal financial assistance.55
In addition to this administrative process, an individual may com-
mence a federal Title IX lawsuit. Even though Title IX does not ex-
pressly create a right of action in favor of an individual, courts have held
that such a right is implicit in the legislation. 6 It appears that a prospec-
tive plaintiff need not first pursue the OCR administrative remedy
before commencing an action in a federal district court, since district
courts have granted preliminary injunctions without the plaintiff first fil-
ing with the OCR.57 In addition to posing the threat of terminating fed-
eral funding, individual plaintiffs may be entitled under Title IX to other
remedies against a non-complying institution, including injunctive58 and
51. For further discussion of OCR compliance reviews, see infra notes 172-173 and accom-
panying text. See also Heckman, supra note 9, at 18-20.
52. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,419 (1979).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. In the area of athletics, the Department of Education rarely applies the formal
administrative process to terminate funds to enforce Title IX. The formal enforcement pro-
cess is usually avoided because institutions have typically developed voluntary compliance
plans acceptable to the OCR. Robert C. Berry and Glenn M. Wong, 2 LAW AND BUSINESS OF
THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES (2d ed.) 272 (1993).
56. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), on remand, 605 F.2d 560 (7th
Cir. 1979). See also Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d
14 (3rd Cir. 1982), motion for reconsideration, 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
57. See Heckman, supra note 9, at 20.
58. For an examination of injunctive relief, see Cheryl L. Schubert-Madsen, Arline F.
Schubert and George W. Schubert, Gender Discrimination in Athletics, 67 N.D. L. REnv. 227
(1991) at 237-38.
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declaratory relief,59 attorneys fees60 and, in some instances, compensa-
tory damages.6'
B. Equal Protection
The enactment of Title IX did not remove the issue of sexual discrim-
ination from constitutional concern.62 In addition to recourse under Ti-
tle IX, aggrieved individuals may also have a remedy based on the
provisions of federal or state constitutions.
1. Federal Constitutional Claims
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tees equal protection of the law to all persons found within the United
States.63 This amendment guarantees, in part, that no person be singled
out from similarly situated people, or have different benefits bestowed
or burdens imposed, unless a constitutionally permissible reason exists
for so doing.64
The constitution does not bar state actors from creating classifica-
tions, or treating groups differently, as long as the differential treatment
is constitutionally justifiable under equal protection analysis. When con-
sidering the constitutionality of a classification, the court utilizes three
different standards of review depending upon the nature of the classifica-
tion. A "suspect" classification based on race, alienage and national ori-
gin, or fundamental rights abridgement, attracts strict scrutiny. Under
this standard, the classification or infringement will be held unconstitu-
tional unless the state can discharge the heavy burden of establishing
that the classification or infringement is supported by a compelling state
interest, and there is no less intrusive means by which the same end may
59. See Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Education v. Ohio High
School Athl. Assn., 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981).
60. Heckman, supra note 9, at 21.
61. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S.Ct. 1028 (1992) (compensatory
damages may be awarded in a Title IX action when the plaintiff is the victim of the defend-
ant's intentional discrimination). See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text for further dis-
cussion of Franklin.
62. Arline F. Schubert, George W. Schubert, and Cheryl L. Schubert-Madsen, Changes
Influenced by Litigation in Women's Intercollegiate Athletics, 1 SEToN HALL. J. OF SPORT LAW
237, 246 (1991).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state
shall "deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The federal
government is held to similar standards under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See Berry & Wong, supra note 55, at 97.
64. Berry & Wong, supra note 55, at 98.
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be achieved.65 The constitutionality of all other non-suspect classifica-
tions have historically been assessed on the rational basis standard.
Here, the state need only demonstrate that the classification bears some
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. This is a far simpler
onus to discharge. More recently, a third test has been espoused by
some courts, set between the two extremes of strict scrutiny and rational
basis. Under this intermediate test, "quasi-suspect" classifications may
only be justified if the state can demonstrate that the classification is
supported by some "important" state interest and there is no less intru-
sive means by which the same end may be achieved. The difference be-
tween "important" under the intermediate test and "compelling" under
strict scrutiny is unclear. However, the onus on the state under the inter-
mediate test would certainly be heavier than under the rational basis
standard.66
Under traditional equal protection analysis, gender-based discrimina-
tion was considered a non-suspect classification, and, on the rational ba-
sis standard, could be sustained by the state unless the discrimination
was found patently arbitrary or bore no rational relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental interest. Under this light burden, it was relatively
easy to justify gender-based rules, or, conversely, difficult for the ag-
grieved plaintiff to challenge the sex discrimination. 67 More recently,
however, gender-based classifications have been considered "quasi-sus-
pect" by some courts, requiring the state to discharge a heavier burden
of exhibiting that the classification is supported by some "important"
state interest and there is no less intrusive means by which the same end
may be achieved.6" As such, this intermediate standard of review en-
hances the prospects for successfully challenging gender-based classifica-
tions, such as a state actor disproportionately accommodating the
athletic interests and abilities of men over those of women.
65. Id.
66. For further discussion of equal protection analysis, see Berry & Wong, supra note 55,
at 97-102; Wong & Ensor, supra note 6, at 354-358; and, Heckman, supra note 9, at 7-8 and
accompanying notes.
67. Wong & Ensor, supra note 6, at 355, 358. For example, health and safety of women
have been used as justifications for denying women the opportunity to participate with men in
contact sports. See, e.g., Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
68. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see also Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Assn.,
695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982).
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2. State Constitutional Claims
In addition to federal and state equal protection claims, some states
provide aggrieved plaintiffs with an additional cause of action based on
an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Depending on the jurisdiction, a
plaintiff may be able to take advantage of a heightened level of scrutiny
given to gender-based classifications. This may render the discrimina-
tion unconstitutional unless the state can discharge the heavy burden of
establishing that the classification or infringement is supported by a com-
pelling state interest and there is no less intrusive means by which the
same end may be achieved. The imposition of this strict scrutiny stan-
dard greatly enhances a plaintiff's prospects for success. This remedy,
while effective, is limited because all states do not have an ERA.6 9 Fur-
thermore, of those that do have an ERA, not all impose the strict scru-
tiny standard to a gender-based classification. v0
It is obvious that in order to ensure the greatest chance for success in
a gender discrimination suit, the wise plaintiff would base the claim on
all possible grounds, including Title IX, equal protection, and, if applica-
ble, a state equal rights amendment.
II. IMPACT OF TITLE IX
A. The First Two Decades
Title IX has been the primary catalyst for the growth of women's
intercollegiate athletics since its passage in 1972. Before Title IX, only
15% of the total number of intercollegiate athletic participants were wo-
men. By 1984 that percentage had doubled to 30.8%. 1 Additionally,
before Title IX, colleges offered an average of 2.5 intercollegiate sports
69. States with equal rights amendments include: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. See Note, Compensatory Damages are
Available in Intentional Sexual Discrimination Cases-Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 3 SETON HALL J. OF SPORT LAW 197, at 142 (1993).
70. Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Washington
apply the strict scrutiny standard of review to their state equal rights amendments. Heckman,
supra note 9, at 7 n.23.
Some commentators suggest that in non-ERA states, the plaintiff could recharacterize the
claim as a violation of the state's due process clause. See Comment, supra note 16 at 703; and
Comment, Haffer v. Temple University: A Reawakening of Gender Discrimination in Inter-
collegiate Athletics, 16 J.C. & U.L. 137, at 143 (1989).
71. Supra note 24.
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for women;72 by 1977, that number had risen to approximately 5.61, and
to 6.9 by 1984.73
After Grove City, women continued to find their place in college ath-
letics even though Title IX no longer posed a threat to college athletic
administrators. Between 1984 and 1988 approximately 450 new NCAA
women's teams were created, raising the average number of women's
teams offered by colleges to 7.31 in 1988.74 While this statistic evidences
that college administrators were willing to voluntarily fund women's
sports,75 a more careful examination reveals that the number of female
athletes, as a percentage of total intercollegiate athletic participants, re-
mained constant throughout this same period. Even though women ac-
counted for approximately half of all college students, they continued to
represent less than one-third of the athletes.76 In addition, a 1989
NCAA study found that while women comprised approximately 30% of
all athletes, women's athletic programs received on average only 18% of
athletic department budgets.77 Clearly, the division of athletic opportu-
nities and resources between the sexes in college athletics was not
equitable.
It was expected that the passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act
in 1987 7 would breath new life into Title IX and revitalize the gender
equity movement. This, however, was not immediately the case. In fact,
figures released by the NCAA in March 1992, as a result of its gender-
equity study, revealed that in 1991 women accounted for only 30.9% of
the total number of intercollegiate athletic participants, virtually identi-
cal to the 1984 percentage of 30.8.79 Further, the NCAA study exposed
that Division I women's athletic programs received on average only
23.9% of athletic department budgets, only modestly better than the
18% they received in 1984.80 After almost twenty years under Title IX,
the full assimilation of women in athletics had not been realized.8'
More recently, however, new and unmistakable momentum has been
rekindled in favor of ensuring women an equitable division of college
72. Comment, supra note 16, at 704.
73. Wong & Ensor, supra note 6, at 347.
74. Comment, supra note 16, at 704.
75. Villalobos, supra note 13, at 151.
76. Comment, supra note 16, at 708.
77. Id at 707.
78. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
79. GENDER-EQuITY STUDY, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIc ASSOCIATION (March
1992).
80. Id.
81. Heckman, supra note 9, at 63,
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athletic opportunities and resources. The mere publication by the
NCAA of statistical information showing that female varsity athletes
were no better off in 1991 than in 1984, revealed that some real work had
to be done to ensure gender equity. Shortly after the release of the re-
sults of its gender-equity study, the NCAA commissioned a Gender
Equity Task Force to thoroughly review the issue and provide recom-
mendations.8' Almost coincidentally with these events, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools.83 Although not an athletics case, many have argued that no
decision has done more to foster Title IX athletics lawsuits and repriori-
tize an institution's agenda for gender equity in athletics than Franklin.84
In Franklin, a female high school student brought a Title IX sexual
harassment suit against a Georgia school district, alleging that school of-
ficials had failed to stop a teacher from forcing unwanted sexual atten-
tion on her for more than a year.8 The Court was presented with the
82. PRESS RELEASE, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssocIArioN (March 11, 1992).
See also supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text for a review of NCAA gender-equity task
force recommendations.
83. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992)
84. Peggy Kellers, Breaking the Silence: Twenty Years of Title IX Litigation, 11 THE
SPORTS LA-WYER 1 (Nov.-Dec. 1992).
85. Franklin, 112 S.Ct. 1028, at 1031. Christine Franklin was a student at North Gwinnett
High School in Gwinnett County, Georgia between September 1985 and August 1989. Id.
According to the complaint, Franklin was subjected to continual sexual harassment beginning
in the autumn of her tenth grade year (1986) from Hill, a sports coach and teacher employed
by the district. Id. The complaint further alleges that though teachers and administrators in
the district became aware of and investigated Hill's sexual harassment of Franklin and other
female students, they took no action to halt it and discouraged Franklin from pressing charges
against Hill. Id. Faced with mounting pressure, Hill resigned in 1988 on the condition that all
matters pending against him be dropped. Id.
Prior to bringing her lawsuit, Franklin filed a complaint with the OCR. After investigating
these charges for several months, the OCR concluded that the school district had violated
Franklin's rights by subjecting her to physical and verbal sexual harassment and by interfering
with her right to complain about conduct proscribed by Title IX. The OCR determined, how-
ever, that because of Hill's resignation and the school's implementation of a grievance proce-
dure, the district had come into compliance with Title IX. It then terminated its investigation.
Id. at 1031 n.3.
Thereafter, Franklin commenced a Title IX action in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that the school district had intentionally discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of sex. The district court dismissed Franklin's complaint on the
basis that compensatory damages were not authorized under Title IX. The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Franklin, 911 F.2d 617 (1990).
Approximately six weeks later in Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit held that compensatory damages were available for certain viola-
tions of Title IX. Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d 779 (3rd Cir. 1990). As a result of the conflict of opinion
between the Third and Eleventh Circuits on this issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Franklin, 111 S.Ct. 2795 (1991).
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issue of whether compensatory damages may be available under a Title
IX cause of action in intentional gender-based discrimination. 6 Over-
turning an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme
Court unanimously concluded that compensatory damages is an avail-
able remedy for victims of deliberate Title IX discrimination. 87
Franklin expands the remedies for redressing the inequities in ath-
letic programs for women and provides a strong financial incentive for
institutions to eradicate discrimination. Previously, the danger in failing
to comply with Title IX was the potential loss of federal funding. While
significant, this remedy has historically proven to be more of a threat
than a reality.88 Franklin has added to this threat, the specter of a mone-
tary damage award for noncompliance, making it more expensive to dis-
criminate than to progress toward equity.8 9 Many commentators have
predicted that Franklin will have considerable impact in advancing the
cause of gender equity in college athletics.90
B. Post-Franklin Progress
Whether specifically sparked by the result in Franklin or not, stu-
dent-athletes have recently become more disposed to litigiously pursue
the preservation and promotion of female athletic opportunities. At the
same time, colleges, universities and their governing athletic organiza-
tions have become more amenable to considering or adopting gender
equity initiatives.
1. Recent Title IX case law
In Roberts v. Colorado State University,91 members of the women's
softball team brought an action against CSU, claiming the university vio-
lated Title IX when it eliminated their softball program and, thereby,
denied women an equivalent opportunity to participate in varsity athlet-
ics. 92 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to reinstate their varsity soft-
ball team and compensation for damages suffered as a result of the cut.
86. Franklin, 112 S.Ct. 1028, at 1032.
87. Id. at 1038. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter. Justice Scalia filed a concurring
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
88. Heckman, supra note 9, at 25.
89. Kellers, supra note 84, at 6.
90. See Heckman, supra note 9, at 25; and Kellers, supra note 84, at 6.
91. 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993), affd, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 126
L. Ed. 2d 478 (1993).
92. Roberts, 814 F. Supp 1507 at 1509.
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The university argued, in defense, that it had not violated Title IX be-
cause men's baseball was also eliminated, and that the cuts had, in fact,
disproportionately affected males.93 Prior to the cuts, women accounted
for 35.2% of CSU's varsity athletes, and 47.9% of its undergraduate pop-
ulation.94 After the cuts, the ratio of women participating in athletics
improved slightly to 37.7% of all CSU athletes.95
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted the
plaintiffs a permanent injunction requiring the university to reinstate the
women's softball team. In doing so, the court applied the OCR's three-
pronged test set forth in the Title IX Policy Interpretation for assessing
an institution's performance in effectively accommodating the athletic
interests and abilities of members of both sexes.96 The court concluded
the decision to terminate the softball program violated Title IX when
viewed in the context of the university's disproportionate athletic partici-
pation rate for women,97 its failure to demonstrate a history of program
expansion for women,98 and its further failure to satisfy the court that
the university was effectively accommodating the athletic interests and
abilities of female students.99
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed,100 emphasizing that the proportional cutting of men's and wo-
men's teams from an already inequitable program was unfair to the
93. Id. at 1512.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See supra, Policy Interpretation discussion at notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
97. Roberts, 814 F. Supp 1507, at 1513. The district court focused on CSU's failure under
Title IX to effectively accommodate student interests and abilities. In assessing compliance
with this requirement, the court referred to the three prong test outlined in the Policy Inter-
pretation, requiring substantial proportionality between athletic participation and undergrad-
uate enrollment, or proof of a history and continuing practice of athletic program expansion
for the underrepresented gender, or proof that the athletic interests and abilities of the under-
represented gender are being fully and effectively accommodated. Id. at 1510. The court
found that a 10.5% disparity between the enrollment of women at CSU and females partici-
pating in athletics exhibited CSU's failure to provide athletic opportunities to women "sub-
stantially proportional" to their representation in the student body. Id. at 1313.
98. Id. at 1516.
99. Id. at 1518.
100. Roberts, 998 F.2d 824. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's use of the Policy Interpretation criteria in determining whether an institution has
effectively accommodated the athletic interests and abilities of its students. Id. at 829. Sub-
stantial proportionality between athletic participation and undergraduate enrollment would
provide an institution with a "safe harbor" for compliance with this requirement. However, in
the absence of such a gender balance, the institution would be required to show that it has
expanded and is continuing to expand opportunities for athletic participation by the under-
represented gender, or else it must fully and effectively accommodate the interests and abili-
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underrepresented gender and violative of Title IX.1° 1 The university
sought a further appeal to the United States Supreme Court, but its ap-
plication was denied without comment.10 2
In Cohen v. Brown University, °3 student members of the women's
gymnastics and volleyball teams were demoted by the university from
full varsity status to intercollegiate club status. They brought a class ac-
tion suit against the university seeking injunctive relief to restore the two
women's teams to varsity status, and to prevent the reduction or elimina-
tion of any other women's varsity teams at Brown.
In early 1991, Brown announced that it planned to drop four sports
from its intercollegiate varsity athletic roster as an athletics cost-cutting
measure: women's volleyball and gymnastics, and men's golf and water
polo. 10 4 The university permitted the teams to continue playing as club
teams, a status that allowed them to compete against varsity teams from
other colleges, but cut off financial subsidies and support services nor-
mally available to varsity teams.10 5
Prior to the cuts, the Brown athletic department supported 31 varsity
sports, 16 for men and 15 for women. Women accounted for 36.7% of
Brown varsity athletes, and 47.6% of its undergraduate population. As a
result of the cuts, Brown's sponsorship of varsity sports was reduced to
27 sports, 14 for men and 13 for women, while the athletic participation
ratio remained virtually unchanged with women accounting for 36.6% of
Brown varsity athletes. 0 6
The plaintiffs contended that the reduction in status of the two wo-
men's varsity programs violated Title IX by denying women an
equivalent opportunity to participate in varsity athletics. In defense,
Brown claimed that it was proportionally accommodating the athletic
interests and abilities of both sexes on campus, and that the reduction to
ties among members of the underrepresented gender. Id. CSU failed on each prong of the
test.
101. Id. at 830. Interestingly, the court noted that Title IX does not require financially
strapped institutions to expand women's programs to comply with Title IX's effective accom-
modation requirement. "Expansion" may not be twisted to find compliance under this prong
when schools have increased the relative percentages of women participating in athletics by
making cuts in both men's and women's sports programs. An institution, however, may bring
itself into compliance with this prong by reducing opportunities for the overrepresented gen-
der while keeping opportunities stable for the underrepresented gender (or reducing them to
a much lesser extent). Id. at 830 n.4.
102. Roberts, 126 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1993).
103. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D. R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
104. Cohen, 991 F.2d 888, at 892.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 892.
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club status of the women's volleyball and gymnastics teams was offset by
similar treatment of the men's golf and water polo teams.107
The federal district court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunc-
tion mandating the reinstatement of varsity women's gymnastics and vol-
leyball at Brown, and prohibiting the elimination or reduction in status
of any existing women's intercollegiate varsity team, pending a full trial
on the merits. Following the three-pronged test enunciated in the Title
IX Policy Interpretation, the court concluded that Brown, in eliminating
the two women's varsity programs, violated Title IX in failing to effec-
tively accommodate the interest and abilities of members of both
sexes.'0 Brown gained a stay of the District Court order pending appeal
to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 9
The district court's order in Cohen was affirmed on appeal." 0 In as-
sessing the university's effective accommodation of the athletic interests
and abilities of its students, the First Circuit, like the district court, uti-
lized the three-pronged test provided in the Policy Interpretation."' In
affirming, the court noted first that at no time in Brown's history had
athletic participation opportunities between men and women been sub-
stantially equivalent, when comparing the percentage of women partici-
pating in intercollegiate athletics at Brown to the percentage of women
undergraduates." 2 Second, Brown failed to provide any evidence of re-
cent program expansion to demonstrate that the institution was respon-
sive to the developing athletic interests and abilities of women. In fact,
107. Id. at 899. Brown argued that the OCR Policy Interpretation does not comport with
Title IX and its regulations. Brown suggested that, to the extent student's interests in athletics
are disproportionate by gender, colleges should be allowed to meet those interests incom-
pletely as long as the school's response is in direct proportion to the comparative levels of
interest. It contended that an institution satisfactorily accommodates female athletes if it allo-
cates athletic opportunities to women in accordance with the ratio of interested and able wo-
men to interested and able men, regardless of the number of unserved women or the
percentage of the student body that they comprise. Id.
The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that the fact that the overrepresented gender
is less than fully accommodated will not, in and of itself, excuse a shortfall in the provision of
athletic opportunities for the underrepresented gender. Id. Rather, the court held that, in the
absence of continuing program expansion, schools must either provide athletic opportunities
in proportion to the gender composition of the student body, or fully accommodate interested
athletes among the underrepresented sex. Id.
108. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 1001.
109. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893.
110. Id. at 891.
111. Id. at 897. The court characterized the Policy Interpretation as "a proper, permissi-
ble rendition of the statute (Title IX)." Id. at 900.
112. Id. at 903. The court held that a disparity of 10.5% between female students and
female athletes did not even closely approach substantial proportionality. Id. at 903.
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Brown had not added a single women's varsity sport since 1982.113 And
third, the court concluded that Brown was not fully and effectively ac-
commodating the athletic interests and abilities of women at the varsity
level, since here, the plaintiffs themselves were examples of specific ath-
letic interest and ability and were seeking to forestall the elimination of
two healthy varsity teams.' 14 Retaining the two women's teams at the
club level was, in the court's opinion, insufficient to satisfy the third
prong of the test." 5
The federal district court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
was presented with circumstances similar to Cohen, in Favia v. Indiana
University of Pennsylvania."6 Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP)
had eliminated school funding for four varsity athletic teams, (women's
gymnastics and field hockey, and men's soccer and tennis), and reduced
each to club status. As in Cohen, the program cuts were made by the
athletic department in response to a directive by the university to reduce
its departmental budget. The plaintiff class, members of the women's
gymnastics and field hockey teams, claimed that the elimination of the
two women's varsity programs violated both Title IX and the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying women an equivalent opportunity to participate
in varsity athletics, and sought a preliminary injunction to restore the
two women's teams to varsity status and to prevent the reduction or
elimination of any other women's varsity teams at IUP." 7
The district court in Favia granted the preliminary injunction rein-
stating the two women's teams and prohibited the university from elimi-
nating further women's teams. They applied the three-pronged test
outlined in the Title IX Policy Interpretation for assessing an institution's
performance in effectively accommodating the athletic interests and abil-
ities of members of both sexes. The court concluded that participation
opportunities between the sexes were not substantially proportionate to
enrollment and that the university had not met its burden of establishing,
under these circumstances, a history and continuing practice of program
expansion for female student-athletes, or that the interests and abilities
113. Id. at 903. See also Cohen, 809 F. Supp., at 991.
114. Id. at 903-904.
115. Id. at 904.
116. Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), mo-
tion to modify order denied on appeal, 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993).
117. Favia, 812 F. Supp. 578, at 579. Prior to the cuts, the IUP athletic department sup-
ported 18 sports, 9 for men and 9 for women. Women accounted for 37.8% of varsity athletes,
and 55.6% of its undergraduate population. As a result of the cuts, IUP's sponsorship of var-
sity sports was reduced to 14 sports, 7 for men and 7 for women, while the athletic participa-
tion ratio for women dropped slightly to 36.5% of IUP varsity athletes. Id. at 580.
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of females had been fully and effectively accommodated." 8 Like Cohen,
the Favia court emphasized that cutting men's and women's teams pro-
portionally from an already inequitable program was unfair and violative
of Title IX.
IUP initially elected not to appeal the district court order, but later
asked the court for modification of the injunction in order to permit the
school to add women's soccer instead of reinstating gymnastics. In deny-
ing the IUP application, the district court concluded that the motion was
in essence a request for reconsideration of a preliminary injunction that
had not been timely appealed. IUP appealed to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit but was unsuccessful. The Third Circuit con-
cluded that, while the proposed substitution of soccer for gymnastics
would increase women's participation in athletics at IUP, and thus im-
prove the school's athletics participation ratio, IUP had failed to meet
the burden required in a motion to modify a preliminary injunction:
demonstrating a significant change in facts from the time the injunction
was issued, which would render inequitable the continuation of the
order.1 9
Roberts, Cohen, and Favia represent significant victories for the gen-
der equity movement. A clear message has been sent to college athletic
departments mandating that they either provide opportunities for both
sexes in proportion to their enrollment, evidence a history and continu-
ing practice of program expansion responsive to the interest and abilities
of the members of the underrepresented sex, or demonstrate that the
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex are being fully and
effectively accommodated. The central finding of each court reaffirmed
the plaintiffs' argument in each case that the proportional cutting of
men's and women's teams from an already inequitable program was un-
fair to women and violative of Title IX. Since many college athletics
programs would fail the rigors of the three-pronged test for accommo-
dating the athletic interests and abilities of its students, the result in Rob-
erts, Cohen, and Favia make it virtually impossible for a college to drop
any women's sport as part of a general cutback in athletic funding. 20
118. Id. at 584-585.
119. Favia, 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993).
120. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 905. The Cohen court emphasized that the pruning of athletic
budgets cannot take place isolated from the legislative and regulatory imperatives of Title IX.
See also Robert Thomas, Jr., Ruling for Brown Women to Be Far-Reaching, Nv YORK
TIMES, April 20, 1993, at B14 column 2.
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Ultimately, Title IX requires that women receive "a larger slice of a
shrinking athletic-opportunity pie" in times of fiscal restraint.12 1
Unlike the three previous cases cited, Cook v. Colgate University121
does not involve an attempt to reinstate a previously eliminated athletic
program. The plaintiffs were all former members of the Colgate wo-
men's club ice hockey team. They sought an order directing Colgate to
grant varsity status to women's ice hockey, contending that Colgate had
violated Title IX in failing to fully and effectively accommodate the ath-
letic interests and abilities of its women's club ice hockey players by re-
peatedly denying their applications for varsity status.'2
In 1990, the year the action was commenced, Colgate offered 23 var-
sity sports, 12 for men and 11 for women. Women accounted for 31% of
all varsity athletes and 46.7% of the undergraduate student body. Var-
sity ice hockey was among the 12 varsity sports offered for men, and the
plaintiffs contended that Colgate's failure to provide women with a com-
parable varsity ice hockey opportunity was violative of Title IX.124
In defense, Colgate argued that Title IX only prohibits discrimination
in an athletic program as a whole, and that the complaint did not allege,
nor did the evidence create a question of fact, that there had been any
gender discrimination in the overall athletic opportunities afforded wo-
men at Colgate. According to Colgate, Title IX compliance ought to be
assessed on a program-wide, rather than sport-specific, basis." z The dis-
trict court, however, did not agree.
In finding for the plaintiffs, the district court ordered Colgate to ele-
vate the women's club ice hockey team to varsity status for the 1993-94
121. Id. at 906.
122. 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. N.Y. 1992), dismissed as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2nd Cir. 1993).
123. A varsity sport team is the official representative of a school with full-time coaches
and specifically designated schedules for competition. Varsity teams are also provided with
equipment, practice facilities and travel accommodations. Club teams, on the other hand, are
principally run by students, have informal schedules, practices and competitions. Their equip-
ment, facilities and travel are of a make-shift nature. See Mel Narol, The New Title IX Game:
Women 2, Colleges 0, 11 THE SPORTS LAWYER 6, at 6, (Mar.-Apr. 1993).
On four different occasions, from 1979 to 1988, members of the women's club ice hockey
team had petitioned Colgate's Committee on Athletics for varsity status. Each petition had
been denied by the Committee, citing the lack of sufficient competition for women's varsity
ice hockey both locally and nationally, the limited interest of students on campus in women's
ice hockey, the inability of the current women's club ice hockey team to compete at the varsity
level, and the prohibitive expense of promoting the club team to varsity status. Cook, 802 F.
Supp. 737 at 740.
124. Specifically, the complaint, in comparing men's varsity to women's club ice hockey
opportunities, alleged discrimination on the basis of financial support, equipment, locker
room facilities, travel, practice time and coaching. Cook, 802 F. Supp. 737, at 744.
125. Id. at 742.
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season, and concluded that the university had violated Title IX by failing
to provide women's club ice hockey participants with an athletic oppor-
tunity equivalent to their male counterparts. After briefly considering
the athletic opportunities available to men and women at Colgate, the
court embarked on a sport-specific comparison of women's club and
men's varsity ice hockey programs. Unlike Roberts, Cohen, and Favia, in
which each court examined Title IX compliance in terms of the total
number of athletic opportunities in relation to the percentage of men
and women in the undergraduate population, the district court, in Cook,
conducted a sport-specific comparison of a club and a varsity team,
which revealed expected inequities. 26 In the court's opinion, none of
Colgate's proffered reasons for refusing to provide women with a varsity
ice hockey opportunity provided the university with a justifiable
excuse.
127
Colgate appealed. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
side-stepped the issue, concluding that the graduation of all named
plaintiffs prior to the 1993-94 school year rendered the action moot.12
Since the plaintiffs were seeking relief in their personal capacities, and
not as representatives of a class, the action became moot since none of
the plaintiffs could personally benefit from an order requiring equal ath-
letic opportunities for women ice hockey players to take effect after their
respective graduations. 2 9
In reaction to the Second Circuit's decision, a second lawsuit has
been filed against Colgate by five female athletes, seeking the same re-
lief as in the Cook action. 30 The issue, therefore, will likely be revisited
on appeal to determine whether the district court in Cook properly in-
terpreted Title IX in comparing Colgate's treatment of male and female
athletes on a sport-by-sport rather than program-wide basis, and by spe-
cifically requiring the university to add women's ice hockey. The law
seems clear that Title IX and its regulations do not require that women
be provided with a replication of men's programs, or that educational
126. Id. at 744.
127. Id. at 740. To justify its refusal to promote the team to varsity status, Colgate argued
that women's ice hockey was rarely played in public high schools and only at some prep
schools, that there was insufficient competition from other schools in the region, that there
was no NCAA championship in women's ice hockey, that the sport lacked general student
interest, that the women's team lacked the ability to play at the varsity level, and that the
school was financially unable to fund a varsity program. Id. at 740.
128. Cook, 992 F.2d 17, at 20.
129. Id. at 20.
130. Sportsline, USA TODAY, August 12, 1993, at 1C.
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institutions allocate equal expenditures to each program offering.131
Rather, the focus of the law is on the equitable treatment of both sexes
in the overall program.132 In the circumstances of this case, however, it
may be argued that the result is correct even though the district court's
analysis seems misguided, because participation opportunities between
the sexes at Colgate were not substantially proportional to enrollment.
Additionally, under these circumstances, the university could not estab-
lish a history and continuing practice of program expansion for female
student-athletes, or that the interests and abilities of females in ice
hockey, for example, had been fully and effectively accommodated.
Even though recent Title IX suits commenced by women have largely
been successful in restoring previously cut programs, actions commenced
on behalf of male athletes seeking to reinstate programs have not pro-
duced similar results. In May 1993, eight members of the University of
Illinois men's swim team filed a federal lawsuit to enjoin the school from
dropping their program. The plaintiffs claimed they were victims of sex
discrimination since the women's team was not also being eliminated.
As part of a university-wide cost cutting effort, the athletic department
was eliminating men's swimming and diving, fencing and women's div-
ing.133 A federal district court judge refused to grant the desired relief,
ruling that the elimination of men's swimming had not violated Title
IX.134 In similar circumstances, a federal district court judge ruled that
Drake University had not violated Title IX when it dropped its wrestling
program and denied the request for a temporary injunction by five mem-
bers of the team who complained that their rights under Title IX were
being violated. 35
2. Title IX Settlements
During the post-Franklin period a number of institutions, in reaction
to a filed or threatened student-athlete complaint, settled pending Title
IX issues by voluntarily adding women's sports, reinstating previously
eliminated offerings, or, in one case, eliminating the entire sports pro-
gram for both men and women. 36
131. See supra discussion at notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
132. Heckman, supra note 9, at 26.
133. Kelley v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. II. 1993).
134. Id. at 243-44.
135. Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
136. Even though this article focuses on post-Franklin settlements, institutions involved in
noteworthy pre-Franklin settlements include: the University of Oklahoma, where the school
announced the cut of its women's basketball program, but voluntarily reinstated the program
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For example, in June 1993, nine female athletes filed a federal Title
IX complaint against Cornell University after the women's gymnastics
and fencing teams were eliminated in a cost-savings move. 37 The action
came after the plaintiffs had attempted unsuccessfully to reach a com-
promise with the university to keep their sports, even as club programs.
The university had reportedly received legal advice that the cuts would
not violate Title IX requirements, because they were cutting more from
their men's athletics program than from the women's. However, in De-
cember 1993, in light of the U.S. Court of Appeals rulings in Roberts,
Cohen, and Favia,3 s Cornell concluded that the interests of the univer-
sity and its students would be best served by settling the claim, and rein-
stating the women's gymnastics and fencing teams, rather than
expending its limited resources on a costly court battle.139
In August 1993, members of the University of California at Los An-
geles (UCLA) women's gymnastics team threatened to file a Title IX
lawsuit if the university did not reinstate its program. In early August,
UCLA had announced the cancellation of both men's and women's gym-
nastics due to athletic department financial problems.140 By late August,
UCLA agreed to reinstate the women's program when threatened with
legal action.' 4 '
As part of a university-wide budget reduction, the University of New
Hampshire athletic department announced the cancellation of its men's
wrestling and women's tennis programs for the 1992-93 academic year.
The two sports were selected in part because the participation and fund-
ing ratios between men's and women's athletics, after the cuts, would be
held constant. Members of the women's tennis team threatened a law-
suit seeking the reinstatement of their sport, contending that since UNH
was not providing athletic opportunities for females in numbers substan-
after the threat of a lawsuit (1990); the University of South Carolina, where the school cut
softball with the intent to replace it with women's track, but reinstated softball and added
women's track under the threat of a lawsuit and after an OCR visit (1991); and, the College of
William and Mary, where the school dropped women's basketball, men's and women's swim-
ming and wrestling, but reinstated the programs when faced with a lawsuit from members of
the women's basketball team (1991).
Information received from the Women's Sports Foundation. The author thanks Mr. Le-
land Brandt of the WSF for his assistance.
137. Update, USA TODAY, June 23, 1993, at 15C.
138. See supra notes 91-119 and accompanying text for discussion of the Roberts, Cohen
and Favia decisions.
139. Carol Herwig, Cornell Settlement Will Restore Women's Gymnastics, Fencing, USA
TODAY, December 9, 1993, at 8C.
140. Sportsline, USA TODAY, August 20, 1993, at 1C.
141. Update, USA TODAY, August 23, 1993, at 9C.
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tially proportional to female representation in the student body, the uni-
versity could not eliminate any women's teams consistent with the
dictates of Title IX, (even if a proportional share of men's participation
opportunities were concurrently eliminated). In March 1992, prior to
the implementation of the cuts, UNH settled the pending claim by rein-
stating the women's tennis program and assuring full Title IX compli-
ance within five years. In August 1993, a formal plan was adopted by
UNH to ensure continued Title IX compliance in athletics. The univer-
sity committed to increase the athletic opportunities available to female
students to ensure that, by the 1997-98 academic year, either the athletic
interests and abilities of female students will be fully and effectively ac-
commodated or participation opportunities will be provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to the enrollment of male and female stu-
dents. The plan envisions increasing squad sizes on current women's
teams, as well as adding women's golf, crew, volleyball and softball. 42
In July 1993, the University of Texas at Austin entered into an agree-
ment to settle a class-action lawsuit which alleged that the university had
violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying varsity intercollegiate athletic opportunities to
female students. 43 By agreement, the university committed to increase
female participation in varsity sports to 44% by the end of the 1995-96
academic year, to increase to 42% the percentage of athletic scholarships
going to women, and to institute women's varsity soccer in the 1993-94
academic year and women's varsity softball not later than the 1995-96
academic year. 44
In February 1993, members of the women's club soccer team at Au-
burn University filed an OCR complaint seeking the promotion of their
club team to varsity status. This complaint was followed by the filing of
a Title IX class-action lawsuit against the university in April 1993 on
142. The author thanks Ronald R. Rodgers, UNH General Counsel, for providing infor-
mation relevant to the UNH gender equity dispute and subsequent settlement, including cop-
ies of the MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (between UNH and members of the 1992 women's
tennis team, dated March 6, 1992) and the PLAN TO ENSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE wrrH
TITLE IX IN ATHLETICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NEw HAMPSHIRE (dated July 15, 1993 and
formally adopted by the university on August 18, 1993).
143. Sanders v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Case No. A-92-CA-405 (W.D. Tex. 1993). The
action, similar to Cook in some respects, was filed by members of four women's club sports
(softball, soccer, crew, and gymnastics) seeking to elevate their programs to varsity status. At
the time the action was filed, women accounted for 47% of UT's undergraduate student body,
but only 23% of its varsity athletes.
144. Id. The author thanks Patricia C. Ohlendorf, Vice Provost of the University of Texas
at Austin, for providing information relevant to the UT gender equity dispute and subsequent
settlement, including a copy of the court order settling the Sanders action.
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behalf of all current and future female student-athletes. The plaintiffs
sought increased funding for all women's sports. 45 In July 1993, the
school entered into a settlement agreement concerning the soccer-re-
lated claims filed against Auburn University both with the OCR and in
federal district court,146 wherein the university agreed to elevate wo-
men's soccer from club to varsity status, and to support and maintain
that program for at least five years, beginning in the fall of 1993. In
addition, the university agreed to pay the Kiechel47 plaintiffs $60,000 in
compensatory damages, and $80,000 in legal fees. 4 8
At the University of Massachusetts, as a component of university-
wide budget cuts, the UMass athletic department eliminated five varsity
sports over a two-year period between 1990 and 1991, including women's
lacrosse, tennis, and volleyball and men's tennis and volleyball. (Men's
soccer was also dropped and then brought back as a result of a private
cash donation). Prior to the cuts, UMass sponsored 26 sports, 13 for
men and 13 for women. Women accounted for 34.5% of UMass varsity
athletes, and 51.5% of its undergraduate population. After the elimina-
tion of the five varsity sports, the women's participation ratio was
slightly reduced to 32.7% of UMass varsity athletes. 14 9 A Title IX suit
was threatened by members of the eliminated women's lacrosse and ten-
nis teams. Ultimately, an October 1992 settlement provided for the im-
mediate reinstatement of the women's tennis, lacrosse, and volleyball
teams. UMass also committed to a goal of full Title IX compliance
within five years, including the doubling of athletic scholarships available
for women.' 50
In January 1992, California State University at Fullerton (CSUF)
eliminated school funding for women's volleyball and men's gymnastics.
Members of the women's volleyball team commenced an action in Cali-
fornia Superior Court against CSUF and the California State University
145. Kiechel v. Auburn Univ., Civil Action File No. 93-V-474-E (M.D. Ala. 1993).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The author thanks Lee F. Armstrong, Auburn University General Counsel, for
providing information relevant to the university's gender equity dispute and subsequent settle-
ment, including copies of relevant court documents in the Kiechel action (SETrL.EMENT
AGREEMENT and FINAL ORDER APPROVING CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT).
149. Edwin Gentzler, Intercollegiate Sports and Equal Opportunity for Women, COUNCIL
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, UNIV. OF MASS. AT AMHERST, March 10, 1992.
150. The author thanks Glenn M. Wong and Carol Barr for providing information rele-
vant to the UMass gender equity dispute and subsequent settlement. At the time of the settle-
ment, Wong served as the UMass Interim Director of Athletics, and Barr as an Assistant
Director of Athletics. The author, at the time of the settlement, was an assistant professor in
the UMass Sport Management Program.
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system, seeking injunctive relief to reinstate their program. They claimed
that the elimination of women's varsity volleyball was discriminatory
and violated the California Education Code as well as the equal protec-
tion guarantee under the California Constitution. 15' Prior to the cuts,
CSUF sponsored 17 varsity athletic programs, nine for men and eight for
women. Women accounted for only 26.6% of CSUF's varsity athletes,
but represented 55.6% of its undergraduate population. As a result of
the cuts, the ratio of women participating in athletics fell slightly to
24.9% of all CSUF athletes. A temporary restraining order was granted
by the California Superior Court in February 1992, followed by the issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction prohibiting CSUF from cutting the wo-
men's volleyball program and altering its budget in March. Under the
threat of an additional federal lawsuit, alleging CSUF violations of Title
IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
university settled the dispute by entering into a consent decree wherein
CSUF, in addition to reinstating women's volleyball, agreed to establish
a varsity women's soccer program for the 1992-93 season. CSUF
pledged to increase the participation ratio of women to 31% in 1992-93,
to 40% by 1997-98, and to a number equivalent to the student body ratio
by 2002-03 (allowing for a 5% variance in any given year), as well as
providing an equivalent percentage allocation of budgetary support. The
university also agreed to form a committee which would conduct annual
gender equity assessments and survey the athletic interests of female stu-
dents every three years. 52
In a further settlement of a class action suit, filed in February 1993
against the entire 20-campus California State University system, univer-
sity administrators committed to work toward providing male and fe-
male students with athletic opportunities and budgetary allocations in
amounts proportional to their respective campus enrollments. The set-
tlement requires reasonable progress with a final deadline for compli-
ance by the 1998-99 academic year.153
Finally, Brooklyn College announced that it was dropping its entire
sports program as part of a college-wide $5.4 million budget cutback in a
surprising move in June 1992. A Title IX complaint had been filed with
the OCR in 1990 by two Physical Education professors at Brooklyn Col-
lege, resulting in an OCR finding that the school was not providing male
151. Howlett v. Gordon, Case No. 680299 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992).
152. Id.
153. Carol Herwig, Gender-Equity Suits Settled, Could Have Far-Reaching Effect, USA
TODAY, October 22, 1993, at 10C.
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and female athletes with equal opportunities to participate in intercolle-
giate sports. In response to the findings, the college pledged full compli-
ance by September 1992, but announced the dismantling of its entire
athletics program a few months prior to that deadline.' 54
These are but a few of the more publicized settlements that, in addi-
tion to the results in Roberts, Cohen, and Favia, have fueled the advance
of gender equity in college athletics. They indicate a realization among
some college athletic administrators that their programs must inevitably
begin to accommodate the athletic interests and abilities of both sexes
on campus.
3. Current Gender Equity Initiatives
In spite of recent developments, many institutions continue to turn a
blind eye to Title IX non-compliance. Based on recent case law, how-
ever, the issue seems unavoidable for most institutions, either through a
complaint-initiated process or, more preferably, a self-directed analysis
and self-imposed plan for future compliance. Failing any meaningful
progress, Congress has also threatened to impose Title IX-related re-
porting requirements subjecting institutional performance to public
scrutiny.155 Under these circumstances, some institutions and their gov-
erning athletic organizations have taken a proactive lead in embracing
the cause of gender equity by proposing or establishing plans designed to
proportionately increase female participation in college athletics.
Immediately following the release of the results of its gender-equity
study in March 1992, revealing that women were indeed second-class cit-
izens in intercollegiate athletics, 56 the NCAA appointed a 16 member
task force of men and women with divergent views to thoroughly review
the gender equity issue and provide recommendations regarding how the
NCAA can better assure that opportunities to participate in athletics are
offered without regard to gender. 57 In July 1993, the task force issued
154. Carol Herwig, Questions Linger in Wake of Brooklyn's Troubles, USA TODAY, June
10, 1992, at 2C.
155. In February 1993, U.S. Representative Cardiss Collins, D-Ill., unveiled a bill entitled
the "Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act." If passed, the bill would require all colleges receiv-
ing federal financial assistance to reveal their male and female varsity athletic participation
ratios and their total expenditures for men's and women's athletics. See Carol Herwig, Com-
pliance with Ttle IX is Aim of Pending Legislation, USA TODAY, February 18, 1993, at 13C.
156. NCAA GENDER-EQuITY STUDY, supra note 79. While women accounted for ap-
proximately 50% of the student body enrollment at Division I institutions, they represented
only 30.9% of varsity athletic participants, and received only 30.4% of scholarship revenue,
22.6% of athletic department operating budgets, and 17.2% of recruiting budgets.
157. See supra note 82.
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its final report in accordance with its charge, wherein it defined gender
equity, 158 outlined key principles of gender equity, provided guidelines
to attain that goal, endorsed "proportionality" as a measure of equity, 59
identified emerging sports for women, and recommended rule changes
to expand scholarship support and participation opportunities for female
athletes.60
Acting on the recommendations of its Gender-Equity Task Force, the
NCAA membership adopted a proposition at the 1994 NCAA Conven-
tion designed to add gender equity to the Association's principles for the
conduct of intercollegiate athletics' 6 1 and another to establish maximum
financial aid limits in emerging sports for women and permit institutions
to utilize the emerging sports in order to meet the Association's mini-
mum sports-sponsorship and financial aid award criteria.6" The legisla-
tion, while supportive of Title IX and creating new opportunities for
women, fails to identify any penalties for Title IX noncompliance. Per-
haps specific penalty provisions will follow at ensuing Conventions. For
now, however, gender equity noncompliance may only be penalized by
the Association through its new certification program, passed at the 1993
Convention. 63 The certification program requires each member institu-
tion to complete an institutional self-study, verified and evaluated
through an external peer-review process administered by the Associa-
tion at least every five years, demonstrating the institution's adherence
to prescribed standards, including a commitment to fair and equitable
treatment of both men and women in intercollegiate athletics, and the
development of a gender equity plan to ensure future adherence to
158. FINAL REPORT OF THE NCAA GENDER-EQUITY TASK FORCE, NATIONAL COL-
LEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, July 26, 1993, at 2. According to the task force report, an
"athletics program can be considered gender equitable when the participants in both the
men's and women's sports programs would accept as fair and equitable the overall program of
the other gender. No individual should be discriminated against on the basis of gender, insti-
tutionally or nationally, in intercollegiate athletics."
159. Id. at 3. The task force suggested that institutions "should support intercollegiate
athletics participation opportunities for males and females in an equitable manner. The ulti-
mate goal for each institution should be that the numbers of male and female athletes are
substantially proportionate to their numbers in the institution's undergraduate student
population."
160. Id. at 2-6.
161. Gender Equity, Financial Proposals Draw Little Fire, NCAA NEws, January 19, 1994,
at 27.
162. Id. The emerging sports identified by the legislation include: archery, badminton,
bowling, crew, ice hockey, squash, synchronized swimming, team handball and water polo.
See 1994 NCAA CONVENTION OFFICIAL NOTICE, Legislative Proposal No. 12.
163. 1993-94 NCAA MANUAL, Bylaw 23.
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evolving Association standards. 64 Gender equity noncompliance is,
therefore, one cause for non-certification, and non-certified schools be-
come ineligible for NCAA championships and related revenue distribu-
tion. 65 While these are certainly significant penalties, some may argue
that the threat of future non-certification may do little to encourage im-
mediate gender equity compliance. However, the threat of non-certifi-
cation is not so distant that athletic administrators can afford to delay in
devising a gender equity plan and implement measures demonstrating
the institution's commitment to fair and equitable treatment of both men
and women in intercollegiate athletics.
Certainly, some will be left disappointed with the NCAA's current
efforts to promote gender equity. Yet, perhaps the Association's pur-
poses, as a national organization, are best served by establishing general
principles and avoiding the temptation to micromanage the issue. Given
the heterogeneity of NCAA membership, specific gender equity require-
ments and resulting penalties for non-compliance may best be left to the
conferences. Some conferences, in fact, have already taken the lead in
this regard.
In May 1992, for example, the Big Ten became the first college con-
ference to adopt a gender equity plan when conference members voted
10-1 to require that women comprise at least 40% of the participants in
intercollegiate athletics at member institutions within five years. 66
When the plan was adopted, women accounted for 30.5% of Big Ten
varsity athletes, and approximately 49% of the undergraduate popula-
tion at Big Ten schools. While praised by some as the first policy of its
kind adopted by a college conference, the measure is not without critics
who argue that a 60:40 male to female participation ratio over a five-year
period is too little over too much time, 67 and that the policy does not
outline specific procedures to reach the goal prior to the deadline.1 68
164. Id. at Bylaw 23.2.4.
165. Id. at Bylaw 23.2.3.
166. Carol Herwig, Big Ten Gives Women's Sports a Boost, USA TODAY, May 13, 1992, at
1C.
167. See Moran, supra note 4, at S8. See also Evon Asforis, Big Ten Moves Toward Gen-
der Equity, THE WOMEN'S SPORTS EXPERIENCE (July-August 1992), at 9 (where Donna Lopi-
ano, executive director of the Women's Sports Foundation is quoted: "The Big Ten should be
commended for being the only conference to grapple with gender equity. Its effort, however,
falls far short of the requirements of law and common sense.").
168. Even though not officially adopted by the Big Ten Conference, its commissioner, Jim
Delaney, has offered some suggestions to achieve the mandated 60:40 male to female partici-
pation ratio, including:
-Conducting campaigns to encourage women to join athletic teams even if they do not
receive an athletic scholarship.
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The University of Iowa, a Big Ten institution, has gone one step further
than its conference office, in committing to provide women, by August
1997, with athletic opportunities in proportion to their representation in
the undergraduate student body.169
In June 1993, the Southeastern Conference adopted a gender equity
proposal requiring its member institutions to provide at least two more
women's sports programs than the number of men's sports offered.170
The proposal, which becomes effective August 1, 1995, requires each
conference member to submit a report, based on a Title IX self-evalua-
tion, to the conference office by June 1, 1994, and commits the confer-
ence office and member institutions to act affirmatively to increase the
quantity and quality of women's athletic opportunities. Specifically, the
proposal mandates an equitable distribution of scholarship funding, ac-
cess to support services, compensation for coaches, and opportunities to
participate, coach and administer.17 '
@Identifying women's sports on each campus that can be upgraded from club status to
varsity competition.
*Creating junior varsity teams in the sports that hold the greatest appeal for female ath-
letes, such as basketball and volleyball.
*Establishing limits on the sizes of men's teams, with reductions of 10 percent or more,
depending on the size required by the needs of each sport.
See Moran, supra note 4, at S8 p.1.
169. PRESS RELEASE, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA SPORTS INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, April
21, 1992.
Christine Grant, women's athletic director and associate professor at the University of
Iowa, has offered the following suggestions to assist universities in enhancing female athletic
opportunities without necessarily cutting men's programs:
*Putting caps on squad sizes in men's sports. Some sports carry many more participants
than are necessary to practice or compete.
eEncouraging the NCAA to increase scholarships (and therefore participation) in existing
women's sports. For example, field hockey needs 22 players to scrimmage, but has a scholar-
ship limit of 11.
:Allowing scholarships to be divided in all women's sports to attract more participants.
eAdding one or two women's sports. Almost all universities now offer more sports for
men.
*Reforming the system at the national level so expensive and nonessential practices are
eliminated.
See Christine Grant, Universities Must Commit to Achieve Parity, USA TODAY, May 14, 1992,
at 14C.
170. The author thanks Mark Whitworth, of the Southeastern Conference (SEC), for pro-
viding a copy of SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES OF GENDER EQUITY, adopted on
June 3, 1993, to be effective after August 1, 1995.
The SEC's current minimum sports offering requirement is seven men's and seven wo-
men's programs. This new proposal will increase the women's minimum to nine.
171. Id.
[Vol. 4:217
GENDER EQUITY IN ATHLETICS
As the administrative agency for Title IX compliance, the OCR has
long been criticized for investigating potential Title IX violations only
after it receives a complaint, rather than taking a more proactive, aggres-
sive approach to enforcing the law. The complaint process has even
been described as an ineffective means of forcing equity.172 In March
1993, the OCR announced its plans to increase the number of Title IX
compliance reviews of intercollegiate athletic programs at randomly se-
lected universities in apparent response to this criticism. During 1993,
fourteen programs were targeted for review.173
III. THE FUTURE?
For institutions that have been dodging the requirements of Title IX
for more than twenty years, it appears the day of reckoning has finally
arrived. We can only expect the floodgates of Title IX athletics litigation
to burst unless universities and their governing organizations take active
steps toward gender equity, including providing women with equitable
opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics. Unfortunately,
this day of reckoning has come when institutions and athletic depart-
ments around the country can least afford it. In a time of cost-contain-
ment, the course many schools will take to improve their female varsity
participation ratios will be to cut men's programs, usually non-revenue
producing sports, rather than add sports for women. 74 Thus, true or
not, the perception is that men's athletic opportunities have become the
sacrificial lamb for gender equity. It is not surprising, therefore, that this
has become such a heated and polarizing issue.
The key "sticking point" in distributing athletic opportunities propor-
tionally between male and female college athletes is clearly the high-
scholarship, high-cost sport of football. In its current big-time form, with
100-man teams and high operating costs, football makes it virtually im-
possible to balance male and female athletic opportunities. Women
quite simply do not have a similar large roster, injury-riddled sport of
their own, made up of offensive, defensive and special-team units. 7 5
The fact that, on average, there are almost as many football players at
172. Kellers, supra note 84, at 6.
173. Sportsline, USA TODAY, March 24, 1993, at 1C. Included among the schools se-
lected for compliance reviews in 1993 were: Colorado State, Fresno State, Iowa State, Jackson
State, Northern Michigan and San Jose State.
174. See Tom Weir, All Must Face Cold Facts of Title IX, USA TODAY, March 13, 1992, at
175. Id.
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Division I institutions as there are female athletes,'176 would lead one to
reasonably conclude that male participants are always going to outnum-
ber females purely because of football.
It becomes readily apprent under current methods of Title IX analy-
sis, it becomes readily apparent that gender-equity will be difficult to
achieve if football is not somehow affected. Yet, even the thought of
down-sizing football creates a battle cry among coaches and alumni, ar-
guing that football is the cash cow that supports all college athletic pro-
grams, whose profitability will be jeopardized by further budget cuts.
Although statistics vary, football unquestionably contributes revenues
that provide a financial nucleus for men's and women's intercollegiate
programs. That money, along with the revenue earned from the NCAA
Division I men's basketball tournament, assists in supporting all of the
non-revenue sports, including women's programs. 177
A gender equity plan that offers practical solutions acceptable to all
involved in this polarizing debate becomes almost impossible to formu-
late. Devising a proposal guaranteeing athletic opportunities for female
students based on their proportional representation in the undergradu-
ate student body may be economically unattainable without significantly
altering men's sports as we now know them. This attracts predictable
opposition from administrators, coaches and participants involved in
men's athletics. On the other hand, any plan falling short of a propor-
tional distribution of athletic opportunities between the sexes attracts
the wrath of gender equity activists. Can an equitable division of college
athletic opportunities between the sexes be realized without significantly
176. According to the NCAA's 1992 Gender-Equity Study, of all Division I athletes,
29.9% are football players and 30.9% are female athletes. The remaining 39.2% represents
non-football playing male athletes. See NCAA GENDER-EQuITY STUDY, supra note 79, at
Table 1.
177. Statistical information examining the financial health of college athletics vary quite
remarkably, however, one is lead to the conclusion that the number of Division I sports pro-
grams that bring in more revenue than they spend are relatively few, perhaps less than 30%.
Even many Division I-A football programs operate at a deficit, however football unquestiona-
bly generates more revenue than any other sport, nearly half the revenue in fact, as Division I-
A schools. Officials at schools with prominent football traditions fear the wrath of the alumni,
boosters and fans if they tamper with what is perceived as the goose that lays the golden egg.
See, Ben Brown, Law Gives Women Their Fair Share, USA TODAY, June 9, 1992, at 2C.
An NCAA study released in August 1994 revealed that men's sports programs under the
flagship sport of football, generate an average of 69% of Division I-A athletic department
revenue. Women's programs produce an average of 4% of total revenues, with the remaining
27% generated from non-gender specific sources. The study also revealed that 67% of Divi-
sion I-A football programs are operating in the black, at an average profit in 1993 of $3.9
million. Eighty-five of the 107 Division I-A schools responded to the survey. See, NCAA
NEws, August 31, 1994, at 5.
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affecting programs currently offered to men? In an attempt to respond
positively to this question, the author has developed a proposal, the
"Three-for-One" plan. It is premised on compromise, seeking some
common ground between those interested in promoting female athletic
opportunities; and those interested in preserving the quality of programs
for men. The plan is formulated in accordance with the three general
areas for assessing Title IX compliance, although addressed in reverse
order, requiring that: (1) institutions accommodate effectively the ath-
letic interests and abilities of female and male students to the extent nec-
essary to provide equal opportunity in the selection of sports and levels
of competition available to members of both sexes; 78 (2) all benefits,
opportunities and treatment afforded participants of each sex be
equivalent; 79 and (3) scholarship assistance be allocated in proportion
to the numbers of male and female participants in intercollegiate
athletics. 180
To effectively accommodate the athletic interests and abilities of both
sexes on campus, the "Three-for-One" plan creates two sports program
pools: Pool A, comprised of football and a group of sports offered for
women only; and, Pool B, encompassing all other varsity sports offerings
at the institution. The Pool A grouping is designed to achieve an equita-
ble balance between preserving the flagship sport of football, and en-
hancing athletic opportunities for women. Since women do not have a
high scholarship sport similar to football, the "Three-for-One" plan, in a
sense, creates one by grouping together three sports offered by the insti-
tution for women only (three-for-one). To qualify as a Pool A for-wo-
men-only (FWO) sport, the FWO program must not be offered to men
at the institution, and must afford at least twelve participation opportu-
nities. In addition, at least two of the three FWO programs must be
team sports. FWO program possibilities will naturally vary regionally
and from school to school, but may include such sports as field hockey,
volleyball, lacrosse, soccer, or other "emerging sports" recently identi-
fied by the NCAA in 1994 Convention legislation.' 81 The plan intends
that these FWO sports be either added as a new sport offering or identi-
178. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 162. Proposal No. 12 passed at the 1994 NCAA Convention estab-
lished maximum financial aid limits in emerging sports for women and permits institutions to
utilize the emerging sports in order to meet the Association's minimum sports sponsorship
and financial aid award criteria. The emerging sports identified by the legislation include:
archery, badminton, bowling, crew, ice hockey, squash, synchronized swimming, team hand-
ball and water polo.
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fled from current sports offered only to women at an institution, without
affecting sports offered to men. In some circumstances, however, eco-
nomic necessity may require that a FWO sport be created by dropping a
matching sport from the men's side. While the distribution of athletics
participation opportunities for both sexes in Pool A sports will not nec-
essarily be proportional to the student body ratio, such a grouping is a
realistic and practical proposal designed to improve an institution's fe-
male athletics participation ratio and comply with the requirements of
Title IX, and reaffirm the unique status of football in collegiate
athletics. 182
The Pool B grouping encompasses all other varsity sports not in-
cluded in Pool A. The plan requires that institutions provide athletic
participation opportunities to both sexes in Pool B sports in proportion
to their respective undergraduate enrollments or demonstrate that the
For purposes of the "Three-for-One" plan, women's softball is considered the equivalent
of men's baseball, and is, therefore, ineligible as a FWO program, unless baseball is not of-
fered to men at the particular institution.
182. The following is a representation of the "Three-for-One" plan's implementation at
hypothetical university (HU), an NCAA Division I institution. Statistics used are derived
from the 1992 NCAA GENDER-EQuTY STUDY, supra note 79. The example is intended to
depict the average Division I institution, and will describe HU athletics program offerings for
men and women both BEFORE and AFTER the implementation of the "Three-for-One" plan.
Men's sports: 8
Women's sports: 7
UGrad student body ratio (M/W): 50/50
Athletics participation ratio (MIW) 69.4/30.6
Men's sports (participants) Women's sports (participants)
Football 109 Volleyball 12
Baseball 33 Softball 17
Basketball 15 Basketball 13
Cross country 13 Cross country 11
Swimming 25 Swimming 22
Tennis 10 Tennis 10
Track 38 Track 26
Golf 11
252 1I1
2. HU ATHLETICS - AFTER "THREE-FOR-ONE" PLAN
EXAMPLE #1.
Implementation of "Three-for-One" plan WITHOUT cutting a men's sport. Changes high-
lighted in bold.
Men's sports 8
Women's sports: 10
UGrad student body ratio (M/W): 50/50
Athletics participation ratio (M/W): 56144
Pool A participation ratio (M/W): 63/37
Pool B participation ratio (M/W): 54146
GENDER EQUITY IN ATHLETICS
Men's sports (participants)
POOL A
Football*
POOL B
Baseball*
Basketball*
Cross country*
Swimming*
Tennis*
Track*
Golf*
Women's sports (participants)
POOL A
97 Volleyball**
Soccer
Crew
POOL B
Softball**
Basketball**
Cross country**
Swimming**
Tennis**
Track**
Golf
POOLS A+B 224 POOLS A+B 175
* denotes a 10% reduction in men's roster sizes
** denotes a 10% increase in women's roster sizes
Example #1 adds 64 female athletic opportunities, by creating three new sports (soccer, crew
and golf), and increasing preexisting women's roster sizes by 10%. The women's athletic pro-
gram enhancement is accomplished in part by a 10% reduction in men's roster sizes. Overall
athletics opportunites offered by HU have increased, after the implementation of the plan,
from 363 to 399.
EXAMPLE #2
Men's sports:
Women's sports:
UGrad student body ratio (MIW):
Athletics participation ratio (M/W):
Pool A participation ratio (M/W):
Pool B participation ratio (M/W):
Men's sports (participants)
POOL A
Football*
POOL B
Baseball*
Basketball*
Cross country*
Tennis*
Track*
Golf*
7
9
50/50
56144
61/39
53/47
Women's sports (participants)
POOL A
97 Volleyball**
Soccer
Swimming**
97
61
POOL B
28 Softball**
13 Basketball**
11 Cross country**
9 Tennis**
34 Track**
10 Golf
POOLS A+B 202 POOLS A+B
* denotes a 10% reduction in men's roster sizes
** denotes a 10% increase in women's roster sizes
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interests and abilities of members of the underrepresented sex have been
fully and effectively accommodated by the overall athletics program. If
an institution does not offer football, all sports would be considered Pool
B sports, dictating compliance with the above stated test. Here again,
the plan intends that women's sports be added to bring the institution
into compliance with Pool B's proportionality requirement. However,
economic necessity may dictate that compliance be achieved by drop-
ping one or more Pool B sports offered to men.
Under the "Three-for-One" plan, the division of participation oppor-
tunities between the sexes will be considered equitable if the institution
has complied with the composition requirements of Pools A and B. The
overall athletics participation ratio under the plan may favor men's op-
portunities. Participation ratios will naturally vary depending on the to-
tal number of opportunites provided and the FWO sports, selected, yet,
on average, institutions following the plan will divide their athletic op-
portunities 55% to men and 45% to women.183 While for some, such a
ratio may not strictly satisfy the popular proportionality benchmark, the
author argues that it will withstand muster under Title IX. The institu-
tion will be able to establish that its overall athletics participation ratio is
substantially proportional to its undergraduate student body ratio, or ex-
hibit a history and continuing practice of program expansion responsive
to the developing interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex, or
demonstrate that the athletic interests and abilities of its students of the
underrepresented sex have been fully and effectively accommodated. 184
In addition, an athletics program, developed in accordance with the
"Three-for-One" plan, might better satisfy the definition for gender eq-
uity proffered by the NCAA Gender Equity Task Force. They provide
that "an athletics program can be considered gender equitable when the
participants in both the men's and women's sports program would accept
as fair and equitable the overall program of the other gender."185
After defining an equitable division of athletic opportunities between
men and women, the "Three-for-One" plan proposes to address the re-
Example #2 adds 44 female athletic opportunities, by creating two new sports (soccer and
golf), and increasing preexisting women's roster sizes by 10%. The women's athletic program
enhancement is accomplished in part by a 10% reduction in men's roster sizes, and the elimi-
nation of the men's swimming program. Since swimming becomes a women's-only sport at
HU, it is now eligible for inclusion in Pool A. Overall athletics opportunities offered by HU
have actually decreased from 363 to 357.
183. See discussion and examples infra note 182.
184. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 158, at 2.
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maining two Title IX compliance requirements in accordance with cur-
rent practices. Institutions would be required to afford their male and
female athletes equivalent treatment, benefits and opportunities in the
eleven program areas enumerated in the Title IX Regulations. 86 Equal
athletic expenditures would not be required, but an athletics program
must exhibit equivalent treatment and distribution of benefits and op-
portunities in terms of equipment and supplies, games and practice
schedules, travel and per diem allowances, coaches and tutors, medical
and training services, housing and dining facilities and services, locker
rooms, practice and competitive facilities, and publicity. The division of
athletic expenditures, excluding scholarships, would be globally assessed
for the entire athletic department with women's programs, under the
"Three-for-One" plan guaranteed a proportioned share. Furthermore,
in accordance with Title IX requirements, scholarship assistance would
be allocated in proportion to the number of male and female partici-
pants in the entire athletic department. 18 7
Since the "Three-for-One" plan envisions the creation of new pro-
grams for women, the obvious question is: how will institutions, bent on
cost-containment, pay for these new programs? First, to avoid the easy
alternative of cutting men's programs to comply with Pool A and B re-
quirements, the plan's success, or indeed any gender equity initiative,
requires the involvement and support of the president's office. This in-
volvement would be formulating the institution's plan for compliance
and securing adequate university resources for its implementation. The
entire institution must internalize and economically commit to the phi-
losophy that the cost of a well-balanced athletic program is worth the
positive public perception emanating from a university devoted to pro-
viding educational and athletic opportunities to all students regardless of
sex.
Second, athletic departments must begin to do a better job of turning
their women's sports into revenue producers. Women's athletics is an
underrated and undeveloped market. It is generating more spectator in-
terest and is considered by many to be the next frontier for women's
intercollegiate athletics.8 The skill level of female competition has im-
proved tremendously in recent years with better coaching and more girls
participating in athletics at younger ages. As a result, women's intercol-
legiate athletics is developing into a less expensive, entertaining alterna-
186. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
188. Comment, supra note 16, at 715.
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tive to men's sports as well as one on which athletic departments would
do well to focus additional marketing efforts. Women's sports offer the
excitement of quality competition, yet currently remain small enough to
capitalize on the marketing appeal of direct fan involvement where spec-
tators pay less and sit closer to the action. 89 Additionally, sponsorship
might be attracted from various corporations that would like to be asso-
ciated with and financially support the popular institutional philosophy.
As such, the cost of a well-balanced athletic program is worth the posi-
tive public perception derived from a university committed to providing
educational and athletic opportunities to all students regardless of sex.
Third, since many men's sports in peril of elimination under any gen-
der equity plan are non-revenue producing, Olympics-related programs,
the United States Olympic Committee and related national sports gov-
erning bodies should become more involved in providing financial sup-
port to college athletic programs. Even though the USOC and national
sport governing bodies are also suffering from revenue shortages, they
do benefit from the collegiate development of Olympic athletes. The
cost to develop these same athletes, should colleges continue to cut these
non-revenue, Olympics-related programs, would certainly be more than
infusing financial support now to help keep them afloat. This extra reve-
nue would allow the current revenue devoted to these programs to be
redistributed to existing or new programs for women.190
Fourth, while the "Three-for-One" plan does not mandate the reduc-
tion of men's sports roster sizes, such a voluntary limitation would allow
an athletic department to redistribute cost savings to women's sports,
without significantly affecting the quality of programs offered to men.19'
Other cost savings might be achieved through altering current practices,
such as further limiting roster or travel squad sizes. Ultimately, how-
189. For further discussion of marketing women's sports see Comment, supra note 16, at
715-718.
190. The NCAA Gender-Equity Task Force, in its Final Report, recommended that the
NCAA develop collaborative efforts with, and examine the possibility of obtaining grants and
other assistance from, the USOC. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NCAA GENDER-EQuITY TASK
FORCE, supra note 158, at 8.
191. At its 1991 Convention, the NCAA reduced athletic scholarships available for Divi-
sion I-A football from 95 to 92 for the 1992-93 academic year, to 88 during the 1993-94 aca-
demic year, and to 85 for the 1994-95 academic year and thereafter. Athletic scholarships for
men's basketball were also reduced from 15 to 14 for the 1992-93 academic year, and to 13 for
the 1993-94 academic year and thereafter. See 1991-92 NCAA MANUAL, Bylaws 15.5.4 and
15.5.5.
The voluntary limiting of men's roster sizes, in addition to football and basketball, and/or
elimination of one or more men's squads, may be necessary to achieve compliance under the
"Three-for-One" plan. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
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ever, in the absence of other revenue sources, the elimination of some
men's sports may be economically necessary and inevitable.
Finally, in consideration of football's special Pool A classification
under the "Three-for-One" plan, the proposal also supports the imple-
mentation of a Division I-A football playoff to provide- an additional
revenue source to indirectly assist in funding women's sports opportuni-
ties. This idea has been debated among college football fans for years,
but has gained recent support within the decision-making ranks of the
NCAA. At the 1993 NCAA Convention, Dick Schultz, then NCAA Ex-
ecutive Director, urged the Association to take a hard look at a playoff
in his "State of the NCAA Address."'192 Schultz emphasized that a Divi-
sion I-A football playoff would be a source of tremendous revenue to
sustain existing athletic programs and to support gender equity reforms.
Even though the playoff concept makes sense to college football fans,
it will not become a reality until the real power-brokers of college sports
- college presidents and chancellors - are serious about such an alterna-
tive. Recently, however, college presidents showed some real signs of
warming to the idea. A significant step in this direction was taken in
December 1993. The powerful NCAA President's Commission ap-
pointed a fact-finding task force to consider the pros and cons of a Divi-
sion I-A football playoff, and to make recommendations to the
Commission, the NCAA Council and the Executive Committee. 93 If
acted upon, implementing legislation could be put to a membership vote
as early as the 1995 convention with playoffs in place for the conclusion
of the 1995 college football season.194 The playoff would answer the col-
lege football fan's argument of who is number one, while generating
much needed revenue for athletic program enhancement. Proponents of
a playoff estimate that a Division I-A championship game could gener-
192. Debra Blum, Schultz Says the NCAA Should Consider a Big-Time Football Champi-
onship Game, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, January 20, 1993, at A45-46.
193. Steve Wieberg, NCAA Task Force to Look at Playoff, USA TODAY, December 8,
1993, at 1C.
194. Numerous two, four, and eight-team playoffs have been proposed, some incorporat-
ing the current New Year's Day bowls, others to be played after the bowls. A number of
corporations have recently made pitches to the NCAA to promote and sponsor a football
playoff, the most noteworthy, perhaps, being Nike and Disney. See Steve Wieberg, Presidents
Inch Toward Considering I-A Football Playoff, USA TODAY, December 8, 1993, at 14C.
The playoff formats currently being preliminarily considered would envision a maximum
14 game schedule, with some combination of 11 regular season games, and three post-season
games. This schedule would then equal the 14 game schedule currently being played by Divi-
sion I-AA, II and III champions.. See Bryan Burwell, Playoff Task Force a Small First Step,
USA TODAY, December 8, 1993, at 3C.
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ate revenue as great as $100 million. 95 Based on conservative estimates
alone, however, revenues would be sufficient to ease the financial crunch
that already has at least two-thirds of Division I programs in the red and
scrambling for some way to pay for the additional demands of gender
equity.196 As such, football, long the sticking point in the gender equity
debate, may ironically be the revenue generating answer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cause of gender equity in athletics is about fairness. Certainly,
many have and will continue to argue that women will never be able to
raise their games to the quality of men's competition, and will never be
able to attract the spectators or revenue that men's sports do. These are
not the real issues here. Athletic competition at our colleges and univer-
sities should, first and foremost, serve an educational purpose, as we
teach and instill in these young participants the values of teamwork,
courage, commitment and fair play. Do not our young women deserve
this educational opportunity as much as our young men?
Through a multitude of factors outlined herein, attitudes toward this
issue are changing and legal imperatives are emerging, producing a so-
cial consciousness that will no longer tolerate an inequitable division of
athletics opportunities favoring one sex over another. Athletic adminis-
trators, facing a certain confrontation with gender equity, must act now
to determine how their limited financial resources can be fairly appor-
tioned in order to ensure that athletics opportunities are equitably di-
vided and sex discrimination eliminated in intercollegiate sports.
195. Wieberg, supra note 194, at 14C.
196. Id.
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